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NOTES
RESTORATION OF PREFERRED STOCK MARGIN OF SAFETY
UNDER THE HOLDING COMPANY ACT
The Securities and Exchange Commission, under powers granted by the Pub-
lic Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,z has been gradually developing stand-
ards for the protection of preferred stockholders by restricting the use of capital
surplus when a capital readjustment' is being effected. Increasing concern has
149 Stat. 838 (1935), IS U.S.C.A. § 79 (Supp. 1940).
2 The term "readjustment" is taken from Buchanan, The Economics of Corporate Enter-
prise 367-70 (194o), and is used to describe any process of altering the rights and interests in
a corporation without court supervision. Buchanan reserves the term "reorganization" for
proceedings under court supervision.
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been shown over the disposition which may be made of the preferred margin of
safety. When this is encroached upon for the payment of dividends or to absorb
a deficit, adequate protection of the position of the preferred shareholder would
seem to require that any diminution be restored out of subsequent earnings
before dividends are paid to common stockholders.
One of the most common types of capital readjustments is the so-called
"quasi-reorganization,"3 which affords a method sanctioned by most state laws
for avoiding the effect of provisions which restrict the payment of dividends dur-
ing the existence of a capital impairment. Deficits due to shrinkage in the value
of assets or to operating or other losses may be written off against capital sur-
plus, thus making subsequent earnings available for the payment of dividends.
Capital surplus is created principally from a reduction of stated capita or an
allocation of paid-in capital, and although state laws may require a charter
amendment in order to effect a reduction of stated capital,4 they generally do
not require subsequent approval by stockholders of the uses to which the capital
surplus is put. As a result, the preferred shareholder may find that the contribu-
tion of junior security holders, as represented by stated capital and capital sur-
plus, has been reduced so that the "cushion," which served as a margin of safety
to prevent injury to his dividend and liquidation rights through operating defi-
cits or a shrinkage in the value of assets, is no longer intact. As long as the cush-
ion remains unrestored, any subsequent payment of dividends out of earnings is,
in effect, a payment out of capital. Experience has indicated that the pre-
ferred shareholder is seldom in a strategic position to protect his rights in the
bargaining that accompanies a readjustment s and he is usually powerless there-
after to force the common shareholders to consent to restoring the reduction.
For that reason, it has been urged that the commission make full use of its
powers under the Holding Company Act to protect preferred shareholders
against the dissipation of the preferred capital cushion.6
The commission has general power under the act to control the creation and
use of capital surplus.7 Its efforts to protect preferred shareholders by requiring
3 See SEC Accounting Series Rel. Nos. x5, i6 (i94o).
4 See, e.g., Il. Rev. Stat. (1939) C. 32, §§ 157.2(1), 157.52, 157.59, 157.60.
s SEC, Management Plans Without Aid of Committees, 483-93 (1938) (Report on the
Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective and
Reorganization Committees, Part VII).
6 See dissenting opinion of Commissioner Frank in Matter of the North American Co.,
4 S.E.C. 434, 482 (1939).
7These powers are derived from §§ 6(a) (2) and 7(e), which prevent alteration in "the
priorities, preferences, voting power, or other rights of the holders of an outstanding security'!
if the commission finds that such changes are detrimental to the interest of investors or con-
sumers. By § 7(f) the commission may permit changes upon "such terms and conditions as
the Commission finds necessary to assure compliance with the conditions" of the section.
§ 12(c) gives the commission the power to control the payment of dividends out of capital
surplus.
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full restoration of any reduction in the capital cushion have been limited, how-
ever, by the desire to secure a sound revaluation of the assets of the companies
under its jurisdiction. The policy of adequate disclosure which is one of the
underlying purposes of the Holding Company Act8 has imposed on the com-
mission the duty of making every effort to bring balance sheet values into line
with present realities. In Matter of Associated Gas and Electric Corp.,9 for ex-
ample, the commission refused to approve a quasi-reorganization when the
company sought to set up a reserve which the commission thought insufficient
to absorb a deficit which would result when assets were revalued and losses
taken on the sale of certain investments. While the soundness of such account-
ing requirements can hardly be questioned,"° the deficit which emerges on the
recognition of the shrinkage in asset values must be charged against earned or
capital surplus if it is to be removed from the books, and where the deficit ex-
ceeds the earned surplus, the preferred capital cushion will be diminished.
The obvious way to restore the reduction and replace the preferred share-
holder in his original position would be the withholding of the payment of com-
mon dividends until the cushion has been reestablished. This, however, is not
always feasible in view of the need of many companies for equity financing.-
The cases indicate that shrinkages in asset values in the public utility industry
amounted to many millions of dollars during the depression period. 2 To re-
strict future dividend payments for an indefinite time while these reductions are
being restored would make the sale of common stock virtually impossible. The
commission has thus generally been unable to supplement its strict requirements
of accurate asset revaluations with the complete safeguards needed to protect
the preferred shareholder. In only one case has the commission demanded full
restoration of the preferred capital cushion following a quasi-reorganization.'3
The argument for preserving the capital cushion is usually based on the prop-
8 See, e.g., § i(b).
9 6 S.E.C. 6o5 (x94o), noted in 49 Yale L. J. 1319 (1940). Cf. Matter of Philadelphia Co.,
Hold. Co. Act Rel. No. 19o5 (194o), where the SEC approved a "quasi-reorganization" al-
though the revaluation reserve set up was considered inadequate to meet subsequent write-
downs that would be necessary. The commission justified its ruling on the ground that the
inadequacies of the reserve might be offset by the sale of certain investments held by the com-
pany, the full values of which were unrecorded.
xo See Katz, Accounting Problems in Corporate Distributions, 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 764,
769 (i94I).
"x Douglas, Democracy and Finance c. 13, Dividends in Arrears (r94o).
X2 See, e.g., Matter of Associated Gas & Electric Corp., 6 S.E.C. 605 (i94o) (write-down of
$173,000,000); Matter of Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 4 S.E.C. 4o6, 4xo (i939) (write-
down of approximately $71,000,000).
'3 Matter of Green Mountain Power Corp., 4 S.E.C. 107 (1938). On the basis of average
earnings of the company during the seven years 1931-37 as set out in the report of the case,
it is estimated that it will take the company, after deducting sufficient earnings for the pay-
ment of preferred dividends, about thirteen and a half years to restore the capital surplus em-
ployed in the quasi-reorganization.
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osition that the preferred shareholder relied on the existence of the contribution
of junior security holders in making his investment and that any reduction
would therefore alter the terms of his agreement of purchase as well as endanger
his liquidation and dividend rights.'4 One may, of course, question whether it is
realistic to approach the problem in terms of the investor's reliance and, in any
event, a purchaser of preferred stock can hardly say that he "relied" on securing
a margin of safety which the state statutes expressly made subject to inroads by
corporate action of various kinds. The efforts of the commission therefore repre-
sent an attempt to add to the preferred stock a desirable safety factor which it
may not have had. It is possible to establish a minimum amount below which
the capital would not be permitted to fall and yet avoid the inflexibility which
results from a requirement that the cushion must be maintained at its original
level. This may underlie the decision of the commission in Matter of Columbia
Gas & Electric Corp.,Is where application was made for authorization to reduce
stated capital in order to create a capital surplus sufficient to absorb a deficit
of approximately $71,ooo,ooo resulting from the revaluation of assets. The com-
mission, while it approved the reduction, ruled that the common shareholders
could not thereafter obtain dividends until the board of directors had set aside
out of earned surplus an amount equal to six quarterly dividends on the pre-
ferred (the equivalent of $9,763,05o, an amount less than the reduction). 6
Restoration may also be made by the sale of new common stock which will
net additional common capital sufficient to replace the reduction. Thus in Mat-
ter of Monongahela West Penn Public Service Co.,'? the commission did not re-
quire any restoration of the preferred capital cushion when the company sought
to reduce its stated capital to eliminate a deficit resulting from the establish-
ment of a reserve for the retirement of certain obsolescent assets of the com-
pany. The commission deemed it sufficient that the company intended to com-
pensate the preferred shareholders by the sale of common stock which would
bring in new capital. With the sale of new stock an immediate prospect, it would
of course be impossible to withhold dividends until the reduction had been re-
stored. Where the preferred stockholders have preemptive rights in such new
shares, however, an additional consideration may arise. To preserve his voting
position, the preferred stockholder will have to contribute to the restoration of
his own capital cushion.
There are several cases in which the commission permitted the use of capital
surplus without restriction beyond reserving jurisdiction over any subsequent
dividend payments. Where the jurisdiction reserved was merely over dividends
'4 Dissenting opinion of Commissioner Frankin Matter of the North American Co., 4 S.E.C.
434, 482 (1939).
"-'4 S.E.C. 406 (1939); see 3 S.E.C. 313, 562, 986 (z938), and 4 S.E.C. 400 (x939); cf. Matter
of the Int'l Paper & Power Co., 2 S.E.C. 274, 580, 792, 1004 (1937), where a reduction was
permitted and no restoration required.
zx6 4 S.E.C. 406, 421 (i939). 7 4 S.E.C. 244 (1938).
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payable from capital surplus, it is apparent that this would not protect the pre-
ferred shareholder, since this reservation does not carry with it power to re-
strict the payment of dividends out of earnings and therefore does not enable
the commission to require restoration of the reduction.' 8 But where jurisdiction
is reserved over the payment of subsequent dividends out of earned surplus,9
there will be an opportunity at a later time to consider whether dividends should
be withheld until the impairment has been restored. The decision ds to what pro-
tection should be given the preferred shareholder is probably postponed in order
that the commission may observe the effects of the readjustment and appraise
thereby the further changes which should be made.
The discussion so far has been devoted to the situation where there is a re-
duction of the preferred capital cushion in order to cancel a deficit which had
prevented the payment of dividends. The cushion may also be diminished by
the direct payment of dividends from capital surplus"° as permitted under most
state laws. The justification for using capital surplus to cover deficits due to
asset revaluations in order that the balance sheet will reflect the present value
of the assets is not present in this situation. Some justification may be found
where capital surplus is used for the payment of preferred dividends in order to
prevent the accumulation of arrearages. There would seem to be no reason of
equal importance for paying common dividends, and the commission appears to
have limited the availability of capital surplus to the payment of preferred di-
vidends.21 Although the commission does not always require the reduction to
be restored,22 where such a payment is made, it is apparent that capital is being
returned in the form of dividends and adequate disclosure of that fact should
be made to the recipients in order to prevent any misconception as to the
source. Some indication of the amount of disclosure which the commission will
require may be found in Matter of the United Corp.23 There the commission ap-
proved the payment of preferred dividend arrearages out of capital surplus, and
specifically ordered that until the capital surplus used for the dividend pay-
ments had been restored out of earnings other surplus accounts shown on any
interim balance sheet which might be published should be captioned "Surplus
28 Matter of the Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., 3 S.E.C. 858 (1938). The commission, of
course, is expressly granted this jurisdiction under § i2(c) of the act.
19 Matter of New York and Richmond Gas Co., 4 S.E.C. 535 (x939); cf. Matter of New
Mexico Gas Co., Hold. Co. Act Rel. No. x883 (194o).
20 § 12(c) of the act expressly provides that no registered holding company or subsidiary can
declare dividends out of capital surplus without the consent of the commission. 49 Stat. 823
(1935), i5 U.S.C.A. § 79(c) (Supp. 1940). See also Rule U-12C-2, Hold. Co. Act Gen. Rules
and Reg. 1203 (1939).
21 Matter of Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 3 S.E.C. 313 (1938).
- Matter of the Securities Corporation General, Hold. Co. Act Rel. No. 2301 (I94o); Mat-
ter of Illinois Power & Light Corp., 2 S.E.C. 263 (1937).
23 Hold. Co. Act Rel. No. i83o (x939).
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subject to adjustment."'24 Also, disclosure of the source of the payment of the
dividend arrearages had to be made and the fact that the capital surplus was
to be restored from future income. 25 The balance sheet was to bear appropriate
footnotes indicating the effect of these transactions and the terms of the com-
mission's order of approval.2
6
As the United Corporation case indicates, the commission may permit the
use of capital surplus to pay preferred dividends, but only on condition that the
diminution will be restored out of subsequent earnings.27 However, the com-
mission has been reluctant to allow the payment of preferred dividends out of
capital surplus where the persistence of an earned surplus deficit raises some
question as to the company's ability to meet subsequent dividend payments
from earnings without the necessity of making further inroads into capital sur-
plus. In such a situation, the commission may refuse the request and precipi-
tate a complete capital readjustment, requiring as it did in Matter of Illinois
Power and Light Corp.28 that the readjustment plan include provisions scaling
down annual preferred dividend requirements so that current earnings would be
adequate for the payment of such dividends.
Thus when prospective earnings are poor, the preferred shareholder may be
required to give up rights even more important than the right to an undimin-
ished capital cushion. Complete protection of the latter has proven difficult when
the company is called upon to absorb a large deficit resulting from the revalu-
ation of assets. The Columbia Gas & Electric case suggests a device which would
seem to afford adequate protection in lieu of complete restoration.29 An exami-
24 Ibid., at 6.
2s Payment of common dividends was prohibited until the reduction was restored.
Matter of the United Corp. Hold. Co. Act Rel. No. 183o, at 7 (1939)-
27 Compare Matter of Securities Corporation General, 5 S.E.C. 859 (I939), with the United
Corporation case.
28 2 S.E.C. 263, 266, ioo (1937). Here the company had paid no dividends on its two classes
of preferred stock since 1933 and, as of the close of 1936, had a substantial deficit in its earned
surplus account. The company, realizing that the SEC would not sanction payment of ac-
crued preferred dividends out of capital surplus except pursuant to a plan of recapitalization,
submitted a plan which decreased preferred and common stock approximately one-half and
scaled down annual preferred dividend requirements from $6 to $2.50 per share. The company
then proposed to issue dividend arrearages certificates to the preferred stockholders and to
create a reserve out of the surplus arising from the reduction of stated capital from which to
pay the dividend arrearages certificates. The SEC approved the arrearages payment plan of
the company without requiring restoration of the reduction surplus from subsequent earnings,
although well aware that it would constitute a "return of capital" to shareholders.
'9 It may be observed that as issues of preferred stock become smaller by reason of the appli-
cation of § 7(c)(1) of the Holding Company Act, which discourages the issuance of preferred
stock, this entire problem will be reduced in importance. It should be noted, however, that as
preferred issues are being retired, it would seem unnecessary to retain the original cushion for
the fewer remaining preferred shareholders. In this situation the holding in the Columbia case,
requiring only partial restoration of the capital cushion based on the dividend requirements of
the outstanding preferred shares, would seem to afford a ready solution.
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nation of the prospectuses of several recent preferred issues indicates that this
type of protection is being adopted by many corporations on their own initia-
tive. Several contain provisions restricting the payment of common dividends
from earnings until a reserve has been established to meet future dividend re-
quirements for a determined period,30 and others contain provisions which stipu-
late that no common dividends can be paid if the value of the corporation's
assets should fall below a certain percentage of the par or liquidating value of
the preferred stock being issued.3' As Commissioner Frank has pointed out,
however, even such desirable provisions as these are ineffective unless the pre-
ferred shareholders are given control of the management when their rights are
in danger.32 Unless this is done, the commission is frequently powerless to ex-
tricate the preferred shareholders from their untenable position in times of
financial stress.
30 Prospectus, June 27, 1939, American Investment Co. 5 (one year); Prospectus, July i8,
1939, Copperweld Steel Co. i4-i5 (four years); Prospectus, Oct. 23, 1939, Abbott Laboratories
ii (three years); Prospectus, Dec. 12, 1939, Scott Paper Co. 8 (two years); Prospectus, March
1g, 1940, Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. 15 (three years); Prospectus, March 25, 1940, Common-
wealth Loan Co. 15 (one year).
Another provision, having a similar effect, is that no common dividends can be paid except
from earned surplus arising subsequent to a certain date: Prospectus, March 25, 1940, Com-
monwealth Loan Co. 15; Prospectus, Oct. 29, i94o, Westvaco Chlorine Products Corp. 12;
Prospectus, Nov. 30, i94o, Neiman-Marcus Co. 6; Prospectus, Oct. 30, i94o, American Air-
lines, Inc. 1.5.
3' Prospectus, June 27, 1939, American Investment Co. 5 (net quick assets of the company
after common dividend must equal i5o per cent of the par value of all outstanding preferred
stock or net assets, and 200 per cent of par value of all preferred stock); Prospectus, Oct. 23,
1939, Abbott Laboratories ii (net tangible assets must equal at least twice the aggregate par
value of preferred stock); Prospectus, Dec. 8, 1939, The Hydraulic Press Mfg. Co. 8 (capital
and surplus must exceed 200 per cent or current assets be above ioo per cent of the par value
of preferred stock); Prospectus, March 25, 194o, Commonwealth Loan Co. 15 (net quick assets
must equal i5o per cent and net assets 200 per cent of the par or stated value of all preferred
stock); Prospectus, Jan. 9, 194o, Seiberling Rubber Co. io (current assets must be in excess
of current liabilities by one and one-half times the liquidation preferences of preferred stock);
Prospectus, March i9, 194o, Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. 15 (capital represented by junior
shares plus surplus must exceed the sum of funded debt plus preferential amount payable to
preferred stock on involuntary liquidation); Prospectus, Apr. 29, 194o, Marshall Field & Co.
12 (net assets must exceed $165 for each share of both classes of preferred stock); Prospectus,
July 16, 194o, Taylorcraft Aviation Corp. io (net assets must exceed the liquidation prefer-
ences of preferred stock); Prospectus, July 18, 1939, Thompson Products, Inc. i6 (net quick
assets must exceed 125 per cent of sum arrived at by multiplying $ioo by the number of shares
of prior preferred stock); Prospectus, Oct. 23, 194o, Auto Finance Co. i i (the net worth of the
company must exceed 175 per cent of involuntary liquidation preferences of preferred stock
exclusive of dividend arrearages).
-- Matter of the North American Co., 4 S.E.C. 434, 488 et seq. (1939). Cf. § 216(I2)(a) of
the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 6&6(i2)(a) (1939), which provides that
a plan of reorganization under chapter X must contain adequate provisions for the election of
directors by the preferred class in the event of default in the payment of preferred dividends.
